Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) - Radiation Emergency Medical Management

Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) - Radiation Emergency Medical Management

Guidance about Initial Protective Actions after an RDD Explosion

• Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Response Guidance, Planning for the first 100 Minutes (PDF - 2.68 MB) (DHS, NUSTL, NNSA, FEMA, November 2017)
  • Delineates missions and tactics that should be executed by first responders and local response agencies in the first 100 minutes of a response to an outdoor explosive radiological dispersal device1 (RDD) detonation,
  • Recommendations are based on realistic estimates of the possible consequences.
  • Includes recommendations for equipment requirements, including personal protective equipment (PPE), and public messaging.
• Scientific Experiments to Operational Tactics for the First 100 Minutes After an Outdoor Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device — Dr. Stephen Musolino’s lecture at the 2016 Annual NCRP Meeting, Bethesda, MD. (YouTube 29:04) 
• Musolino SV, Harper FT, Buddemeier B, Brown M, Schlueck R. Updated Emergency Response Guidance for the First 48 H after the Outdoor Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device. Health Phys 2013;105(1);65-73.
  • See photo of radioactive dispersal from an experimental RDD explosion.
  • See diagram of hypothetical dispersal possibilities.
  • This important paper updates an earlier version from 2006. It uses experimental and modeling data to provide guidance about the "predicted range of radioactive ballistic fragments that could endanger first responders and the public."
  • See diagram of recommended initial Protective Action Zones from this paper.
    • Before definitive environmental radiation measurements are performed, the authors recommend that incident managers establish an empiric "initial hazard boundary corresponding to the potential for acute health effects" of "250 meters in all directions from the site of the incident". This is smaller than the 500 meter boundary recommended in the authors' previous paper from 2006. Subsequent actual measurements may alter these perimeter recommendations.
    • "This boundary is independent of the total activity of the radioactive material." It reflects confidence that debris from radioactive ballistic fragments would likely fall within 250 meters of the explosion.
    • The authors also recommend a "wider initial Shelter-in-Place Zone, 500 meters in all direction from the incident site and 2,000 meters downwind." This will diminish the chance of "encountering the undiluted aerosol plume and hence an acute exposure from inhalation (if the device generated significant aerosol, shine from a highly radioactive fragment, or injury from the detonation of a secondary improvised explosive device".
    • "Persons who are outside, or in s significantly damaged or 'smoky' building, should immediately move to the nearest robust, intact structure; if the event is a small one, people should move out of the immediate area provided that there is a clear path but still take shelter in an intact nearby building."
    • "In both cases, people should remain in the shelter until the local officials direct them to proceed to an uncontaminated evacuation route, and downwind of the detonation site, sheltering should be extended out to 2,000 meters to avoid a lower level exposure to the aerosol plume."
  • The paper also discusses aerosol dispersal.
    • "The assessment of the potential range and effects of dispersal from small particles as aerosol remains unchanged from guidance issues in 2006."
    • The article provides more detailed guidance about this kind of complex radioactive aerosol dispersal from various kinds of scenarios, and how to provide response guidance based on these measurements.
  • The paper also provides detailed guidance for how to take measurements for evaluating the level and location of the radiation contamination after an RDD explosion.