domingo, 26 de octubre de 2014

Improving pandemic influenza risk assessment. [Elife. 2014] - PubMed - NCBI

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Geographic distribution of publicly available influenza virus genetic sequence data in comparison to poultry and swine populations.

(A) Proportions of worldwide animal population by country (data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). (B) Number of unique influenza viruses for which sequence data exists in public databases from poultry or swine by country. Numbers of influenza virus sequences are not representative of influenza virus surveillance activities. Information regarding surveillance activities is not readily available. Virological surveillance, even if robust, may result in negative findings and is not captured in these figures. Most countries do not sequence every influenza virus isolate and some countries conduct virological surveillance without sharing sequence data publicly. Sequences deposited in public databases can reflect uneven geographic distribution and interest regarding viruses of concern such as H5N1 and H9N2.

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.03883.004

2014 Oct 16;3. doi: 10.7554/eLife.03883.

Improving pandemic influenza risk assessment.

Russell CA1, Kasson PM2, Donis RO3, Riley S4, Dunbar J5, Rambaut A6, Asher J7, Burke S8, Davis CT9, Garten RJ10, Gnanakaran S11, Hay SI12, Herfst S13,Lewis NS14, Lloyd-Smith JO15, Macken CA16, Maurer-Stroh S17, Neuhaus E18, Parrish CR19, Pepin KM20, Shepard SS21, Smith DL22, Suarez DL23, Trock SC24, Widdowson MA25, George DB26, Lipsitch M27, Bloom JD28.

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Abstract

Assessing the pandemic risk posed by specific non-human influenza A viruses is an important goal in public health research. As influenza virus genome sequencing becomes cheaper, faster, and more readily available, the ability to predict pandemic potential from sequence data could transform pandemic influenza risk assessment capabilities. However, the complexities of the relationships between virus genotype and phenotype make such predictions extremely difficult. The integration of experimental work, computational tool development, and analysis of evolutionary pathways, together with refinements to influenza surveillance, has the potential to transform our ability to assess the risks posed to humans by non-human influenza viruses and lead to improved pandemic preparedness and response.